Psychological Warfare: Cold War Russia: While psychological warfare had been a tool to support more direct military operations in World War II, during the Cold War psychological warfare became an end in itself. A Russia considered anything related to its psychological operations classified until the mid-1990s, it remains difficult to find too many details about its programs. That does not keep analysts and researchers from reverse-engineering Soviet psychological strategies based on knowledge of their efforts, and on recognized psychology in general.
While the U.S.S.R. engaged heavily in the same leaflet and propaganda operations that formed the basis for early 20th Century Psychological Operations, they did not limit their psychological aggression to such tangible measures. Indoctrinating the concept of reflexive control into Soviet Psychological Operations, they allowed field commanders to consider psychology a general weapon. Reflexive control is a "branch of the theory of control related to influencing the decisions of others. In a military context, it can be viewed as a means for providing a military commander with the ability to indirectly maintain control over his opponent commander's decision process." (Reid, 1987, p. 294) Put simply, it means controlling the information an enemy receives to manipulate decisions more favorably for one's own side. The World War II British "Man Who Never Was" operation might qualify, but Russian doctrine breaks this down to a field commander level. Reflexive control actualizes the idea of war's objective as manipulation of the will.
The U.S.S.R. mastered censorship as a means of controlling information received by its own citizens. It could not allow the perception -- however brief -- that any fault in the state existed. Images of past leaders turned dissidents disappeared from group photos in the public record, with only tattle-tale shoes or shadows to show they had been there. Cosmonaut deaths in space went unpublicized, with honors only rewarded posthumously under approaching Perestroika.
History of Psychological Warfare: USSR Active Measures: The Soviet Union's employed psychological tactics and strategies as a part of "Active Measures" (' M'). These coordinated tactics from disinformation to assassination. While most warfare seeks to identify and exploit enemy weaknesses, active measures proactively sought to create new weaknesses altogether. A foe aware of a weakness can take efforts to reinforce it, but manipulating perception could create weaknesses of which the enemy was unaware. The USSR employed active measures liberally and proactively as early as the 1920s, laying the foundation for the future covert battlefield for the Cold War. Among early successes, they fabricated a dissident organization just to lure an exiled anti-Soviet and England's Lt. Sidney George Reilly (the presumptive model for Ian Fleming's James Bond) back into Russia. The plan succeeded and resulted in their execution.
"Active Measures" was a formal program, not just a random confluence of covert approaches. Appropriate KGB operatives received formal active measures training. Its psychological effectiveness involved careful mixture of limited truth to establish credibility with outright deception to manipulate choice.
Psychological Warfare: Cold War Era USA vs. USSR: Perhaps no literal war has ever affected so many as the Cold War, in which the United States and the Soviet Union spent most of half a century engaged in warfare by proxy. Lands as far removed from each other as Afghanistan and Granada felt the pressures of two dominant world powers in conflict -- but trying to avoid direct confrontation. The doctrine of mutually assured destruction, which had led each nation to stockpiling huge reserves of nuclear weapons, also generated the reluctance for direct conflict. Earmarked by American successes like the Berlin Airlift and failures like the Bay of Pigs invasion, one incident ultimately epitomized the Cold War conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S. R.
The Cuban Missile Crisis was really when the United States won the Cold War. A true battle of wills with the fate of the world at stake, the showdown over Soviet missiles based in Cuba brought the two great powers to the brink of war for 13 days in October 1962. In the end the U.S. won, the Soviets backed down -- and likely for one reason.
The Soviets blinked because they believed that if it came down to it, America would make a first strike against them. They believed it because American officers -- many reluctantly -- believed it. General Curtis Lemay ("Bombs Away Lemay") showed no sign of melting resolve for attack among even his most intimate acquaintances. Nothing can so firmly influence thinking so much as can a known precedent. Soviets might order planes to fly low over U.S> bases in Pakistan with bomb bay doors open, to show how loaded they were, but that did not change one fact. America had already used nuclear bombs on another country -- twice. In October 1962 when secretly weeping American base commanders in Europe obediently sent planes with full payloads soaring toward Soviet airspace, amid the intractable rhetoric of Lemay, they believed their men would follow orders, and they believed Lemay would give the order.
If they believed it, the Soviets certainly did, so Russia blinked. The U.S. not only won the present crisis, but won the Cold War right then. It just took another few decades for the U.S.S.R. to accept defeat. The evidence that Soviets believed they would likely suffer a first nuclear strike and that U.S. strategists did not believe America would remains in the divergence of equipment design after that. Americans embraced lighter and more efficient electronics in aircraft, suggesting they believed these planes would never have to function following a nuclear EMF emission, which wastes solid state electronics. Many Soviet planes continued using vacuum tubes despite access to electronics. Tubes do not fail during a nuclear EMF wave. Soviets prepared to keep planes in flight during a nearby nuclear strike.
Even the final victory of the Cold War rested in Soviet perception of U.S. military power. When the CIA produced overestimations of Soviet Military strength, this figured crucially into Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign and election. Americans, believing the disinformation about Soviet military strength, supported massive increases in weapons production. Any idea -- from missiles launchers on buried train lines in Utah, to supporting a particle accelerator ostensibly to produce a missile defense shield -- received funding, but even more publicity. Mutually assured destruction meant that Soviets had to keep up in production, and spent themselves into bankruptcy. That all happened because of the power of perception.
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James Scott is the CEO of Princeton Corporate Solutions, a corporate globalization and political strategies firm, PCS offers a unique blend of think tank, corporate and governmental communication strategies to expedite the facilitation of long lasting relationship building in these necessary sectors. http://princetoncorporatesolutions.com
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